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Abstract
With tens of billions of new IoT devices being utilized, and the advent of quantum computing,
our future and our security needs are rapidly changing. While IoT devices have great potential
to transform the way we live, they also have a number of serious problems centering on their
security capabilities. Quantum computers capable of breaking today’s encryption are just
around the corner, and we will need to securely communicate over the internet using the
encryption of the future. Post-quantum public-key encryption and key-establishment algorithms
may be the answer to address those concerns. This paper used the benchmarking toolkit
SUPERCOP to analyze the performance of post-quantum public-key encryption and
key-establishment algorithms on IoT devices that are using ARMv8 CPUs. The performance of
the NIST round 2 algorithms were found to not be significantly different between the two
ARMv8 devices.
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Chapter I: Introduction
Introduction
Today’s network environment is seeing an exponential increase in the use of devices
collectively known as the Internet of Things (IoT). These devices, such as sensors, medical
devices, TVs, webcams, home thermostats, remote power outlets, lights, door locks, home
alarms, etc., are all everyday objects that have been embedded with computing devices that
allow them to send and receive data via the Internet, and also to be interconnected with each
other. These IoT devices frequently operate on a Low power and Lossy Network (LLN), and
their applications are often quite constrained. As production costs decrease, IoT devices are
becoming more and more ubiquitous in all aspects of our lives.
Many of the IoT devices use Advanced RISC Machine(ARM) processors. ARM is an
instruction set for processors that uses the reduced instruction set computing (RISC)
architecture. ARM cores are used in products ranging from smartphones, digital cameras,
handheld game consoles, and single-board computers such as the Raspberry Pi. ARM
processors have improved cost, power consumption, and heat dissipation compared to
processors used in desktop computers (Aroca & Gonçalves, 2012). According to ARM Holdings
CEO Simon Segars, in 2017 there has been 100 billion ARM-based chips shipped since 1991.
ARM estimates that it will only take 5 years for them to ship the next 100 billion ARM-based
chips, leading to their prediction that IoT devices will skyrocket into the hundreds of billions
(Hughes, 2017).
While IoT has great potential, it also has a number of serious problems centering on the
security capabilities of the connected devices. Post-quantum public-key encryption and
key-establishment algorithms may be the answer to address those concerns. Currently, there
are algorithms for post-quantum public-key encryption and key-establishment that are
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undergoing the second round of National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
evaluation. Of the 26 algorithms that made it to the second round, 17 of them are public-key
encryption and key-establishment algorithms. “In 2020, NIST plans to either select finalists for a
final round or select a small number of candidates for standardization” (Alagic et al., 2019,
p.18).
Problem Statement
With the tens of billions of new IoT devices being utilized in the near future, they will
need to be able to securely communicate over the internet using the encryption of the future.
Tomorrow’s encryption algorithms must be able to function on today’s IoT devices.
Nature and Significance of the Problem
Security for today's IoT devices is actually a multifaceted issue. One of the most
pressing issues is its lack of public-key encryption and key-establishment schemes, which
leaves all the devices vulnerable to attack from hackers. “If one thing can prevent the Internet of
things from transforming the way we live and work, it will be a breakdown in security” (Oxford
dictionary, example sentence). This prophetic quote not only provides an eloquent warning, it
perfectly sums up the significance of having adequate security for IoT devices. While adding
current public-key encryption will be an acceptable short term security solution, it will fail to be
proactive in addressing future security needs. In the not too distant future, the advent of
quantum computers capable of breaking today’s encryption will bring new security challenges,
and left unaddressed, will render IoT devices vulnerable once again.
It is imperative that those responsible for providing security for IoT Devices be forward
thinking, and take into account how technologies will likely evolve. In order for IoT security to
possess long term viability, algorithms must either be initially designed with post quantum
security, or the applications must allow for algorithms to be easily replaced with ones that do
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have post-quantum security (McKay et al., 2016). Public key cryptography can still be
considered for inclusion if it can meet the necessary conditions, which include being robust
against quantum attacks, and using a combination of general public key cryptographic schemes
along with lightweight primitives, such as lightweight hash function. Unfortunately, “because the
majority of modern cryptographic algorithms were designed for desktop/server environments,
many of these algorithms cannot be implemented in the constrained devices used by these
applications” (McKay et al., 2016, p. iii). Either new algorithms must be created, or existing
algorithms must be modified to fit in the constrained devices as well as meet the new standards
for post-quantum public-key encryption and key-establishment. The performance of these
algorithms need to be tested in other environments as well as the desktop/server environment.
Objective of the Study
The objective for this study is to use the SUPERCOP toolkit to collect performance data
on post-quantum public-key encryption and key-establishment algorithms that are running on
IoT devices using ARMv8 CPU architecture. The performance metrics collected for the
key-encapsulation mechanisms include the number of cycles for generating a key pair,
encapsulation of keys, and decapsulation of keys. The performance metrics collected for
public-key cryptosystems include cycles to generate a key pair, to encrypt a short message, and
to decrypt a short message.
Study Questions/Hypothesis
There will be no significant difference between the Raspberry Pi 3B+ and the Raspberry
Pi 4 ARMv8 devices when measuring the benchmarked performance of public-key encryption
and key-establishment algorithms using SUPERCOP.
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Limitations of the Study
This study is limited by the compatibility of the different post-quantum algorithm
implementations with the SUPERCOP benchmarking toolkit. Not all of the post-quantum
algorithm implementations in the second round of the NIST competition have public-key
cryptosystems available for benchmarking in the SUPERCOP toolkit. Another limitation of this
study is the C compiler compatibility to compile the post-quantum algorithm implementations.
More on the compiler errors can be viewed in Appendix A.
Definition of Terms
Internet of Things (IoT) - There is no universally-accepted definition that exists for IoT.
In the NIST special publication titled “Network of ‘Things’”, the author describes the underlying
foundations for IoT without defining the IoT. He claims “That is useful since there is no singular
IoT, and it is meaningless to speak of comparing one IoT to another” (Voas, 2016, p. 1). He
describes Primitives as building blocks to describe the IoT, which will allow for comparisons
between the different IoT’s.
Primitives offer a unifying vocabulary that allows for composition and information
exchange among differently purposed networks. They offer clarity regarding
concerns that are subtle, including interoperability, composability, and
continuously-binding assets that come and go on-the-fly…. This model does not
specify a definition for what is or is not a ‘thing'. Instead, we consider that each
primitive injects a behavior representing that ‘thing’ into a NoT’s(IoT) workflow
and dataflow. ‘Things’ can occur in physical space or virtual space. (Voas, 2016,
p. 1)
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The primitives that are defined for the IoT are sensors, aggregators, communication channels,
external utilities, and decision triggers. These make up the core components for the Internet of
Things.
Low power and Lossy Network (LLN) - A network of embedded devices that have
limited power, memory, and processing capability.
ARM - Advanced RISC Machine is a family of reduced instruction set computing (RISC)
architectures for computer processors.
RISC - Reduced Instruction Set Computer is a computer that has a small set of simple
and general instructions.
Post-Quantum Cryptography - Cryptographic algorithms that are resistant to attacks
from quantum computers.
Public-key Encryption - Cryptographic system that utilizes a pair of keys, one public
and one private. To ensure security, only the private key is required to be kept secret. The
public key can be openly distributed without compromising security.
SUPERCOP - System for Unified Performance Evaluation Related to Cryptographic
Operations and Primitives. SUPERCOP is a toolkit developed for measuring the performance of
cryptographic software.
Summary
Today’s IoT devices are very vulnerable to attack from hackers. While current public-key
encryption will provide immediate protection, and should be standard on all network connected
devices, it will not address future security needs that will arise with the advent of the quantum
computer. The number of new IoT devices is going to be in the billions. They will need to be
able to securely communicate over the internet using post-quantum encryption. Tomorrow’s
encryption algorithms must be able to function on today’s IoT devices. The primary objective for
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this study is to analyze the performance of post-quantum public-key encryption on IoT devices
that are using ARM CPUs.
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Chapter II: Background and Review of Literature
Introduction
This chapter will focus on the background information and literature reviewed in this
study, as well as literature that is related to the methodology used. The articles published to
date discuss the importance of having encryption on IoT devices, but are lacking in detailed
information regarding the topic of this paper. Topics that this chapter covers include IoT
guidelines, why devices should be made powerful enough to use encryption, introduction to the
NIST algorithms, and literature related to the methodology used.
Background and Literature Related to the problem
According to Hewlett Packard’s 2015 report “Internet of Things research study,” 70
percent of IoT devices did not encrypt communications to the Internet and local network, and 60
percent did not use encryption when downloading software updates. These numbers were
pulled from testing 10 devices that they believed to be a good indicator for the IoT market at that
time. It's a good bet that IoT security has changed very little since then.
By the year 2020, Cisco predicts there will be over 50 billion IoT devices connected to
the internet, while Gartner, a global research and advisory firm, more modestly predicts the
internet of things will be closer to 20 billion units. While there is no clear consensus on the exact
number of IoT devices that will be in use by 2020 and beyond, the range for the predictions of
total number devices is consistently in the tens of billions. That makes for a lot of vulnerable
devices that are connected to the internet.
As IoT data travels through multiple hops in a network, a proper encryption
mechanism is required to ensure the confidentiality of data. Due to a diverse
integration of services, devices and network, the data stored on a device is
vulnerable to privacy violation by compromising nodes existing in an IoT network.
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The IoT devices susceptible to attacks may cause an attacker to impact the data
integrity by modifying the stored data for malicious purposes. (Khan & Salah,
2018, p. 397)
If you don’t use encryption in your IoT environment, then you may get hacked.
In 2019, NIST came out with a list of guidelines called the “Core Cybersecurity Feature
Baseline for Securable IoT Devices: A Starting Point for IoT Device Manufacturers”. These
guidelines were developed to help promote the best available practices for mitigating risks to
IoT devices. Topics covered by the guidelines include the common risk mitigation area of Data
Protection, which includes protecting data in transmission from unauthorized access and
modification. These are just recommendations from NIST, and are not regulations that have to
be followed.
There are several potential barriers to using encryption on IoT devices. “Encryption can
protect sensor data transmission integrity and confidentiality including cloud-to cloud
communication, but it might render the IoT sensors unusable due to excessive energy
requirements” (Voas, 2016, p. 22). In order to make sure that a device is capable of using
encryption, it needs to be designed with a powerful enough CPU and have enough energy to
power it.
Many sensor networks depend on the timely transmission of sensor data to
aggregators or other controllers. Any delay of sensor data — especially in
time-critical applications such as CO alarms — due to latency can have serious
consequences or can render the sensor data useless. Security solutions (e.g.,
device authentication, encryption) applied to sensor networks may introduce
latency. (Cichonski et al., 2019, p. 29)
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Devices need to be designed with powerful enough CPUs because encryption is a
processing-intensive operation. “Be forward-looking and size hardware resources for potential
future use. As an example, if a device has a 10-year lifespan, it may be necessary to update the
encryption algorithm or key length the device uses, and the new algorithm or key length may
make encryption more processing-intensive” (Fagan et al.,2019, p. 14).
As we look towards the post-quantum future, encryption processing needs will increase.
With this increase, the devices that we have today may not be powerful enough to perform
cryptography. That is why when we design an IoT device today, we need to keep the resources
of the hardware in mind.
Select or build a device with sufficient hardware resources (e.g., processing,
memory, storage, network technology, power), as well as firmware and software
resources, to support the desired features. For example, encryption is
processing-intensive, and a device with limited processing might not be able to
support encryption that customers need. Some devices cannot support the use of
an operating system or Internet Protocol (IP) networks. (Fagan et al., 2019, p. 14)
Making a device powerful enough to use encryption can be difficult when the device is
battery-powered. When a device runs on a battery, the most important thing is keeping the
power draw low, and in particular low standby power, as devices can be asleep for minutes or
hours before waking up briefly. The power needed for the device to use encryption may be
unattainable, or may unacceptably shorten the battery life.
Currently NIST is on round 2 for the selection of the standards for post-quantum
cryptography. Round 3 will begin sometime in 2020 or 2021. NIST considers the cost and
performance of the algorithms to be the second most important characteristic for selecting the
next standards. Memory requirements and computational efficiency are both considerations in
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the cost of the algorithm. “NIST has completed preliminary efficiency analysis of the
post-quantum public-key encryption algorithms on the reference platform, an Intel x64 running
Windows or Linux and supporting the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) compiler” (Alagic et al.,
2019, p. 5). NIST has only been considering the performance of these algorithms using an Intel
x64 CPU and not any ARM processors. This is one area that is lacking an efficiency analysis for
these algorithms.
Out of the starting 82 candidate public-key encryption and digital signature algorithms,
only 26 remain in the second round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization
Process. The 17 Second-Round Candidate public-key encryption and key-establishment
algorithms include; BIKE, Classic McEliece, CRYSTALS-KYBER, FrodoKEM, HQC, LAC,
LEDAcrypt, NewHope, NTRU, NTRU Prime, NTS-KEM, ROLLO, Round5, RQC, SABER, SIKE,
and Three Bears. The 9 digital signature candidate algorithms in the second round include;
CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM, FALCON, GeMSS, LUOV, MQDSS, Picnic, qTESLA, Rainbow, and
SPHINCS+.
Literature Related to the Methodology
To compare other partially related methodologies, the research paper on “A
Comprehensive Evaluation of Cryptographic Algorithms: DES, 3DES, AES, RSA and Blowfish,”
was examined. In it, the authors go over the different evaluation parameters that they used in
their experiment. In this project, the parameters that will undergo analysis include encryption,
decryption time, and memory used. Encryption time is the time it takes for the encryption
algorithm to convert plaintext into ciphertext. Decryption time is the opposite, the ciphertext is
converted back into plaintext. The encryption and decryption time will be measured in
milliseconds. This time will affect the performance of the system. The different algorithms will
use different key sizes, number of operations done by the algorithm, initialization vectors used
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and type of operations. This leads to requiring different memory sizes for implementation of the
different algorithms (Patil et al., 2016).
Summary
This chapter reviewed IoT guidelines, discussing the common risk mitigation area of
Data Protection. It also examined the roadblocks to using encryption on IoT devices, with lack of
enough power being the biggest obstacle. The 17 NIST post-quantum public-key encryption
algorithms were introduced, and although somewhat limited, the available literature related to
the methodology was reviewed.
Although the articles published to date do show a robust discussion about the
importance of having encryption on IoT devices, there is a lack of detailed information regarding
the topic of this paper, which is focused on analyzing the performance of post-quantum
public-key encryption algorithms on IoT devices that are using ARM CPUs.
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Chapter III: Methodology
Introduction
This chapter will provide an explanation of the methodology used and the procedures
applied in order to achieve the objectives of this research. The first section covers aspects of
how the study was designed, including a discussion of the data collected and the hardware
used. The next section focuses on the algorithm implementations that were used in this study,
and it includes an explanation of the selection criteria used to choose the algorithms tested. The
last section of this chapter focuses on the benchmarking toolkit SUPERCOP, and its use in this
research.
Design of the Study
This study used a quantitative approach to determine how well each of the post-quantum
public-key encryption and key-establishment algorithms, found in the second round of NIST
standardization, performed on chosen hardware. Due to the large number of different
implementations that each of the algorithms have, this paper only focused on the performance
of one of the implementations per post-quantum algorithm. If none of the implementations for
one of the algorithms were able to compile on the chosen device and operating system, then
that algorithm was not included in the study. The operating system and processor architecture
were chosen to maximize the number of working implementations for analysis.
The implementation chosen for each of the post-quantum schemes were the optimized
versions if they were available. If an optimized version was not available, then the reference
implementation was used instead. If there were multiple versions with different key lengths, then
the implementation with the shortest key was chosen. The implementations of the post-quantum
schemes were integrated into the benchmarking toolkit SUPERCOP.
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Data Collection
Data collection was conducted using the benchmarking toolkit SUPERCOP version
20191221. This toolkit includes key-encapsulation mechanisms for all 17 of the post-quantum
public-key encryption and key-establishment algorithms. It also includes several of the
public-key cryptosystems. All of the Key-Establishment Mechanisms (KEM) data was collected
using the SUPERCOP toolkit ECRYPT Benchmarking of Asymmetric Systems (eBATS).
Performance measurements for KEM that SUPERCOP collects are listed on the bench.cr.yp.to
website. (Bernstein, n.d.)
●

Time in cycles to generate a key pair - the secret key and the corresponding public key.

●

Time for encapsulation - time to compute a ciphertext and corresponding session key.

●

Time for decapsulation - the time to compute the session key from the ciphertext.

●

Space in bytes for a public key.

●

Space in bytes for a ciphertext.

●

Space in bytes for a session key.

Performance measurements for the public-key cryptosystems that SUPERCOP collects are
listed on the bench.cr.yp.to website. (Bernstein, n.d.)
●

Time in cycles to generate a key pair - the secret key and the corresponding public key.

●

Time to encrypt a short 59 byte message.

●

Time to decrypt a short 59 byte message

●

Space in bytes for a secret key.

●

Space in bytes for a public key.

●

Ciphertext length for a 0-byte message.

●

Ciphertext overhead for a 23-byte message.

●

Ciphertext overhead for a long message.
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Hardware and Operating System Environment
This study used both the Raspberry Pi 3 B+ and Raspberry Pi 4 to conduct the
performance tests. The operating system used was the current version of Ubuntu 19.10. This
allowed both the Raspberry Pi 3B+ and Raspberry Pi 4 to run the ARMv8 instruction set
architecture. The ARMv8 architecture introduced the 64 bit execution state AArch64, making it
compatible with the benchmarking toolkit SUPERCOP (Arm Ltd, n.d.).
The first ARMv8 device to be tested was the Raspberry Pi 3B+. It has the Broadcom
BCM2837B0 quad-core A53 processor running at 1.4 GHz as well as 1 GB of RAM. The
Raspberry Pi 3B+ is shown below in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Raspberry Pi 3 B+
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The other system on a chip (SoC) that was tested was the Raspberry Pi 4. It has a
Broadcom BCM2711, Quad coreCortex-A72 processor running at 1.5GHz. It also has twice as
much memory as the Raspberry Pi 3B+ at 2 GB of RAM. The Raspberry Pi 4 is shown in Figure
2 below.

Figure 2. Raspberry Pi 4
Summary
This chapter discussed how this study was designed, which data measurements were
germane to collect, and important details about the hardware used. For the scope of this study,
it is important to define why each of the implementations were chosen. The benchmarking
toolkit SUPERCOP was very useful for testing out many different measurements related to
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cryptographic performance. The toolkit came prepackaged with all of the latest post-quantum
cryptographic algorithms needed for this study. Although the Raspberry Pi 3B+ and the
Raspberry Pi 4 look practically identical on the outside, under the hood, the Raspberry Pi 4
possesses superior processing speed and RAM. The tests listed in this chapter put the
hardware to the test to see if the algorithms would perform significantly different depending on
which device was being used.
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Chapter IV: Data Presentation and Analysis
Introduction
This chapter presents and analyzes the data collected by the methods mentioned in the
previous chapter. First, the data that was collected will be presented in a series of tables and
graphs. Next, the performance of each of the different key-encapsulation methods will be
analyzed for both the Raspberry Pi 3B+ and Raspberry Pi 4. The last section of this chapter will
focus on analyzing the performance of the public-key cryptosystems.
Data Presentation - Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms
The following tables include data collected from 14 of the 17 post-quantum
key-encapsulation mechanisms using version 20191221 of SUPERCOP. There were 3
algorithms that had failed to compile while running the tests. More information on those 3
algorithms and why they failed can be viewed in Appendix A. For information on the compile
time, primitive, implementation and the compiler used for the algorithm implementations that
were able to successfully compile, see Appendix B. The tables for space size, in bytes, that
each algorithm used for a secret key, public key, ciphertext, and session key, can be viewed in
Appendix C. Each of the algorithm implementations in the tables are either the optimized
versions, the version with the smallest key length, or the version that was able to compile. The
following tables show the first quartile, median, and third quartile cycles it took to either generate
a key pair, encapsulation, or decapsulation of keys for both of the devices tested. The values
are the average of many speed measurements ("eBACS: ECRYPT Benchmarking of
Cryptographic Systems", n.d.).
Table 1 and Table 2 show the cycles to generate a key pair for the Raspberry Pi 3B+
and Raspberry Pi 4 respectively. For both devices, the fastest key-encapsulation mechanism to
generate key pairs was lightsaber and the slowest key-encapsulation mechanism to generate
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key pairs was mceliece348864f. There was a massive difference between the fastest and
slowest key-encapsulation mechanism tested. The fastest key-encapsulation mechanism,
lightsaber, was over 4500 times faster than the slowest mceliece348864f for key generation. For
both the RAspberry Pi 3B+ and the Raspberry Pi 4 there were stability issues with many of the
Classic McEliece algorithm implementations generating keys. The key-encapsulation
mechanism mceliece348864f was one of the only Classic McEliece algorithm implementations
that did not have stability issues. The algorithm implementations that did have stability issues
tended to produce a large variance between the first, median, and third quartile.
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Table 1
Cycles to generate a key pair for KEM on Raspberry Pi 3b+
quartile

median

quartile

system

161220

161702

162019

lightsaber

194547

196753

205281

r5nd0kem2iot

266971

265331

268275

kyber512

283474

282306

286272

newhope512cca

331105

331725

332057

threebears624r2cpax

1505188

1517069

1536146

hqc1281

3944721

3995211

4012819

ntrukem443

21096658

21111815

21172881

sntrup653

21968557

21975555

21985111

frodokem640

53282599

101947929

151081615

bike2l1nc

112207782

112577462

112777600

ledakem13

148714473

161685593

190310821

ntskem1264

170332098

170273427

171121725

sikep503

735216332

741023508

745088028

mceliece348864f
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Table 2
Cycles to generate a key pair for KEM on Raspberry Pi 4
quartile

median

quartile

system

100288

99373

99529

lightsaber

107115

108324

112041

r5nd0kem2iot

134446

133962

134134

kyber512

134772

134505

135136

newhope512cca

208662

209888

210125

threebears624r2cpax

1036922

1068988

1079539

ntrukem443

1175044

1183380

1206649

hqc1281

12367120

12385844

12442216

sntrup653

15911486

15944148

15981147

frodokem640

25234359

47522680

69974155

bike2l1nc

69931488

70185868

70424832

ledakem13

94252120

141133288

312818998

ntskem1264

144212647

144185373

144533570

sikep503

437367115

449889390

454446677

mceliece348864f

The next two tables show the number of cycles it took for encapsulation. This is the time
it takes to compute a ciphertext and corresponding session key, given a user's public key. The
fastest and slowest key-encapsulation mechanisms for key generation were the two fastest
encapsulation schemes for both Raspberry Pi 3B+ and Raspberry Pi 4.
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Table 3
Cycles for encapsulation on Raspberry Pi 3B+
quartile

median

quartile

system

228944

227909

228451

lightsaber

283309

295304

463256

mceliece348864f

288099

289925

298868

r5nd0kem2iot

330755

331240

332722

ledakem13

377220

378673

381677

kyber512

414093

414212

418681

threebears624r2cpax

440119

441561

453019

newhope512cca

450100

459282

478675

ntrukem443

508543

544320

607653

ntskem1264

727667

729533

735709

sntrup653

2211011

2229902

2249088

bike2l1nc

3024409

3046613

3069753

hqc1281

24180080

24185866

24209172

frodokem640

280446444

280476545

281379281

sikep503
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Table 4
Cycles for encapsulation on Raspberry Pi 4
quartile

median

quartile

system

142244

149368

154765

mceliece348864f

143773

143444

143490

lightsaber

160110

161077

166302

r5nd0kem2iot

179223

180000

180322

kyber512

210296

208937

209215

ledakem13

210882

210550

211079

newhope512cca

214501

217742

249918

ntrukem443

258894

261057

261494

threebears624r2cpax

424221

459114

523020

ntskem1264

482848

487049

488390

sntrup653

1343338

1359618

1442061

bike2l1nc

2342002

2368109

2415056

hqc1281

18255132

18356963

18388720

frodokem640

237423418

237557045

238075832

sikep503

The next two tables show the number of cycles it took for decapsulation. This is the time
it takes to compute the session key from the ciphertext, given the user's secret key. Once again
the slowest algorithm implementation was sikep503 for both the Raspberry Pi 3B+ and the
Raspberry Pi 4. Lightsaber was beaten by both threebears624r2cpax and r5nd0kem2iot for the
fastest implementation for decapsulation.
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Table 5
Cycles for decapsulation on Raspberry Pi 3B+
quartile

median

quartile

system

61266

61233

61334

threebears624r2cpax

146201

156040

156925

r5nd0kem2iot

276788

277128

277370

lightsaber

491568

488199

490089

kyber512

538448

540960

557435

newhope512cca

738774

741586

753260

ntrukem443

1227650

1239358

1335353

mceliece348864f

1343348

1357655

1383831

ntskem1264

1666956

1666587

1671357

sntrup653

2131109

2134735

2161925

ledakem13

5162268

5172510

5237488

hqc1281

24401849

24436275

24498193

frodokem640

64049890

64152064

76001578

bike2l1nc

298374048

298407255

299534009

sikep503

31
Table 6
Cycles for decapsulation on Raspberry Pi 4
quartile

median

quartile

system

38522

38339

38391

threebears624r2cpax

82311

83016

84223

r5nd0kem2iot

167236

167685

168379

lightsaber

218907

219436

219466

kyber512

243330

243308

244938

newhope512cca

291892

292805

298973

ntrukem443

669115

676821

679115

mceliece348864f

863900

899553

927884

ntskem1264

1083039

1083628

1087204

sntrup653

1383899

1390815

1414088

ledakem13

3613350

3744759

3796920

hqc1281

18208288

18235332

18249562

frodokem640

26192249

26254360

27222465

bike2l1nc

252600237

253272348

253456422

sikep503

Data Presentation - Public-Key Cryptosystems
The following tables include data collected from the three cryptosystems that were
available in version 20191221 of SUPERCOP. These are the cryptosystems that were
submitted to the second round of the NIST competition for public-key encryption. SUPERCOP
included other cryptosystems of algorithms other than the ones submitted to the NIST
competition. However, they were not relevant to this paper and therefore were not included in
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the tables below. The tables for the secret key, public key, encrypting 0 bytes, encrypting 23
bytes, and encrypting many bytes are included in Appendix D. Each of the algorithm
implementations in the tables are the optimized versions. The following tables show the first
quartile, median, and third quartile cycles it took to either generate a key pair, encrypt 59 bytes,
or decrypt 59 bytes for both of the devices tested. The three public-key cryptosystem algorithms
tested in this paper are NTRU Prime, LEDAcrypt, and Round 5.
Table 7 and 8 below show the cycles to generate a key pair for the Raspberry Pi 3B+
and Raspberry Pi 4 respectively. There was a huge discrepancy between the fastest and
slowest algorithm. The algorithm implementation r5nd1pke5d was over six thousand times
faster than ledapkc10 for both devices. For each of the algorithms, the Raspberry Pi 4
outperformed the Raspberry Pi 3B+.
Table 7
Cycles to generate a key pair for public-key encryption on Raspberry Pi 3B+
quartile

median

quartile

system

173636

174079

175740

r5nd1pke5d

1712548

1722841

1799144

ntruees401ep2

1068451694

1070934568

1072781948

ledapkc10

Table 8
Cycles to generate a key pair for public-key encryption on Raspberry Pi 4
quartile

median

quartile

system

97220

99188

99784

r5nd1pke5d

621187

637728

641796

ntruees401ep2

655194875

683602187

685294895

ledapkc10
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The tables 9 and 10 below show the number of cycles it took to encrypt 59 bytes of data
on the Raspberry Pi 3B+ and Raspberry Pi4 respectively. The implementation ntruees401ep2
had a faster time for encryption than r5nd1pke5d, even though the latter was much faster for
key generation.
Table 9
Cycles to encrypt 59 bytes on Raspberry Pi 3B+
quartile

median

quartile

system

102309

103019

109573

ntruees401ep2

290008

290793

292096

r5nd1pke5d

20689497

20700112

20710384

ledapkc10

Table 10
Cycles to encrypt 59 bytes on Raspberry Pi 4
quartile

median

quartile

system

61229

62513

62837

ntruees401ep2

163139

166090

166737

r5nd1pke5d

13714784

13644864

13658967

ledapkc10

Table 11 and Table 12 show the number of cycles for decrypting a 59 byte message.
Once again, ledapkc10 was the slowest algorithm out of the three by far on both the Raspberry
Pi 3B+ and Raspberry Pi 4.
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Table 11
Cycles to decrypt 59 bytes on Raspberry Pi 3B+
quartile

median

quartile

system

149209

150341

158108

ntruees401ep2

420210

421204

422267

r5nd1pke5d

5694057

5698432

5702822

ledapkc10

Table 12
Cycles to decrypt 59 bytes on Raspberry Pi 4
quartile

median

quartile

system

75879

75248

76495

ntruees401ep2

230025

230488

231765

r5nd1pke5d

3218949

3267138

4427467

ledapkc10

Data Analysis
The data collected by SUPERCOP was first examined by creating several graphs that
show how closely the grouping was for the algorithms on both of the devices. Then calculations
were done for a two-tailed paired t-test. The null hypothesis for each of the different
key-encapsulation mechanisms were tested using this t-test.
The performance of the KEM key generation time comparing the Raspberry Pi 3B+ and
the Raspberry Pi 4 can be seen in Figure 3 below. The graph is on a log scale for both the x and
y axis. The x axis shows the time in CPU cycles and the y axis shows the public key size in
bytes. The data points to the farthest left are the algorithms that were the fastest. The data
points are on the same level vertically, because the algorithms generate a public key that is the
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same length on both of the devices.

Figure 3. KEM Key Generation Time. Key-encapsulation mechanism cycles to generate key
pairs vs. size of public key.
The next graph shows how the data for KEM encapsulation time is grouped for both the
Raspberry Pi 3B+ and the Raspberry Pi 4. This graph has a log scale on both the x and y axis.
The x axis shows the time in CPU cycles and the y axis shows the ciphertext length in bytes.
The data points are on the same level vertically, because the algorithms generate a public key
that is the same length on both of the devices.
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Figure 4. KEM Encapsulation Time. Key-encapsulation mechanism cycles to encapsulate keys
vs size of the ciphertext in bytes.
The next graph shows how the data for KEM decapsulation time is grouped for both the
Raspberry Pi 3B+ and the Raspberry Pi 4. This graph has a log scale on both the x and y axis.
The x axis shows the time in CPU cycles and the y axis shows the ciphertext length in bytes.
The data points are on the same level vertically, because the algorithms generate a public key
that is the same length on both of the devices.
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Figure 5. KEM Decapsulation Time. Key-encapsulation mechanism cycles to decapsulate keys
vs size of the ciphertext in bytes.
While the graphs above give a good visualization of several different performance
metrics, including the time to generate a key pair, the time for encapsulation, and the time for
decapsulation, the two-tailed paired t-test was used to determine if the null hypothesis should be
rejected. The probabilities were created by comparing the difference in the mean time for each
of the algorithms on both the Raspberry Pi 3B+ and the Raspberry Pi 4. These probabilities
were compared against a significance level of ⍺ = 0.05. This process was repeated for all of the
different performance metrics collected. Due to the limited scope of this paper, described in the
methodology chapter of this paper, the statistical analysis has a limited sample size that only
includes the best algorithm implementations.
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Summary
This chapter presented the data collected using the SUPERCOP toolkit. During testing,
only 14 of the 17 KEM algorithms were able to compile to run the tests. The graphs give a good
visualization of how all of the performance metrics for each of the algorithms compare on the
Raspberry Pi 3B+ and Raspberry Pi 4. The three cryptosystem algorithms tested showed that
one of the algorithms was way slower than the other two. Finally, this chapter also discussed
how the two-tailed paired t-test was used to determine if the null hypothesis should be rejected.
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Chapter V: Results, Conclusions, and Future Work
Introduction
This chapter will review the results of the data that was analyzed in the previous chapter.
First, the null hypothesis will be broken down into its different measurable performance metrics.
Next, the conclusions of this study will be presented. Finally, future work related to this study will
be discussed.
Results
The null hypothesis of this study proposes that there is no difference between the two
ARMv8 devices regarding the benchmarked performance of public-key encryption and
key-establishment algorithms using SUPERCOP. The null hypothesis was tested by doing a
statistical analysis for each of the measurable performance metrics to see if the two devices
performed significantly different. This study explores several different performance metrics,
including the time to generate a key pair, the time for encapsulation, and the time for
decapsulation.
The first null hypothesis proposes that there will be no difference between the two
ARMv8 devices regarding the performance of the time to generate a key pair for the KEMs. The
time to generate a key pair for the key-encapsulation mechanisms is the number of cycles it
takes to generate a secret key and a corresponding public key. The results from the Raspberry
Pi 3B+ (M = 95524670, SD = 196217289) and the Raspberry Pi 4 (M = 63156072, SD =
122431006) indicate that there was no significant difference between the two devices, t(13) =
1.58, p = .137. With the probability being higher than the ⍺ = 0.05 in the two-tailed paired t-test,
the null hypothesis is accepted and the alternative hypothesis is rejected.
The second null hypothesis proposes that there will be no difference between the two
ARMv8 devices regarding the performance of the time for encapsulation. The time for

40
encapsulation is the number of cycles it takes to compute a ciphertext and corresponding
session key, given a user's public key. The results from the Raspberry Pi 3B+ (M = 22432206,
SD = 74536171) and the Raspberry Pi 4 (M = 18722862, SD = 63166994) indicate that there
was no significant difference between the two devices, t( 13) = 1.22, p = .244. With the
probability being higher than the ⍺ = 0.05 in the two-tailed paired t-test, the null hypothesis is
accepted and the alternative hypothesis is rejected.
The third null hypothesis proposes that there will be no difference between the two
ARMv8 devices regarding the performance of the time for decapsulation. The time for
decapsulation is the number of cycles it takes to compute the session key from the ciphertext,
given the user's secret key. The results from the Raspberry Pi 3B+ (M = 28630827, SD =
79576776) and the Raspberry Pi 4 (M = 21900157, SD = 67066381) indicate that there was no
significant difference between the two devices, t(13) = 1.69, p = .115. With the probability being
higher than the ⍺ = 0.05 in the two-tailed paired t-test, the null hypothesis is accepted and the
alternative hypothesis is rejected.
Conclusion
The results of this study show that the speed for the public-key encryption and
key-establishment algorithms tested on the Raspberry Pi 3B+ and Raspberry Pi 4 were not
significantly different. Taking a look at the number and selection of the samples may help
explain how this result was not totally unexpected. This study was narrowly focused on testing
only the fastest implementation (optimized or had the shortest key length) for each of the tested
post-quantum algorithms. With only 14 post-quantum algorithms tested, this selection process
generated a small sample size. Having such a small sample size can affect the quality of the
results for the statistical analysis.
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This study does not take into account the different security levels for each of the algorithm
implementations. If the focus of the algorithm was to be as robust as possible to attacks, such
as perfect forward secrecy, resistance to side-channel and multi-key attacks, as well as
resistance to misuse, then that algorithm would need to sacrifice speed for increased security.
Depending on the security needs, it may be more beneficial to use the slower algorithm
implementation for encryption. The implementations that are more optimized were able to
perform better on all hardware without causing a significant bottleneck, while poorly optimized
implementations may lead to bottlenecks and exacerbated differences in algorithm speed.
Future Work
When NIST moves onto round 3 of the post-quantum cryptography public-key encryption
and key-establishment algorithms standardization, even more performance testing should be
done. For example, this study does not include memory testing. Future studies should include
testing on how much memory is used for generating keys, encapsulation, decapsulation, etc.
Other hardware to consider for future testing are ARM Cortex-M series processors.
These processors are optimized for cost and power-efficient microcontrollers. They use less
energy and are less powerful than the ARM Cortex-A. Neither of the Raspberry Pi 3B+ nor
Raspberry Pi 4 are considered to be constrained devices. The ARM Cortex-M series processors
are used on constrained devices where memory, CPU processing power, and CPU power draw
can be a problem.
The SUPERCOP version 20191221 had problems compiling on the ARMv6 Raspberry
Pi Zero W. The Raspberry Pi Zero W only runs AArch32, and had problems trying to compile the
different post-quantum algorithms. Of the 17 post-quantum algorithms, there were three
algorithms ( ROLLO, LAC, and RQC) that had problems compiling on the Raspberry Pi devices
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used in this study. Future testing of the post-quantum algorithms should take this into account
and make sure that there are implementations available that are able to compile correctly.
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Appendix A
The three post-quantum key-encapsulation mechanisms that failed to compile include
ROLLO, LAC, and RQC. When the algorithms failed to compile, SUPERCOP produced an error
output. The error output is listed here in Appendix A.
ROLLO is a compilation of the three post-quantum schemes Rank-Ouroboros, LOCKER,
and LAKE. Both LAKE and LOCKER are included in SUPERCOP version 20191221. For
ROLLO, neither LAKE nor LOCKER would compile correctly. Due to the compiler errors it is not
included in the main analysis of this study. The Compiler output is pasted below.
Compiler output for locker1:
Implementation: crypto_kem/locker1/ref
Compiler: g++ -march=native -mtune=native -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv -fPIC -fPIE
try.cpp: /usr/bin/ld:
/home/djb/benchmarking/supercop-20191221/supercop-data/pi3bplus/aarch64/lib/libntl.a(GF2E.
o): undefined reference to symbol 'pthread_setspecific@@GLIBC_2.17'
try.cpp: /usr/bin/ld: //lib/aarch64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0: error adding symbols: DSO missing
from command line
try.cpp: collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
Compiler output for lake1:
Implementation: crypto_kem/lake1/ref
Compiler: g++ -march=native -mtune=native -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv -fPIC -fPIE
try.cpp: /usr/bin/ld:
/home/djb/benchmarking/supercop-20191221/supercop-data/pi3bplus/aarch64/lib/libntl.a(GF2E.
o): undefined reference to symbol 'pthread_setspecific@@GLIBC_2.17'

46
try.cpp: /usr/bin/ld: //lib/aarch64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0: error adding symbols: DSO missing
from command line
try.cpp: collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
The LAC implementation lac128 had both a checksum failure and test failure outputs
after trying to compile. It is not included in the main analysis of this study. The compiler output is
pasted below.
Checksum failure for lac128:
Implementation: crypto_kem/lac128/opt
Compiler: gcc -march=native -mtune=native -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv -fPIC -fPIE
Test failure for lac128:
Implementation: crypto_kem/lac128/opt
Compiler: clang -mcpu=native -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv -Qunused-arguments -fPIC
-fPIE
error 111
crypto_kem_dec does not match k
Compiler output for lac128:
Implementation: crypto_kem/lac128/avx2
Compiler: clang -mcpu=native -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv -Qunused-arguments -fPIC
-fPIE
bin-lwe.c: In file included from bin-lwe.c:1:
bin-lwe.c: In file included from /usr/lib/llvm-9/lib/clang/9.0.0/include/immintrin.h:14:
bin-lwe.c: /usr/lib/llvm-9/lib/clang/9.0.0/include/mmintrin.h:50:12: error: invalid conversion
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size
bin-lwe.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_vec_init_v2si(__i, 0);
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bin-lwe.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
bin-lwe.c: /usr/lib/llvm-9/lib/clang/9.0.0/include/mmintrin.h:129:12: error: invalid conversion
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size
bin-lwe.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_packsswb((__v4hi)__m1, (__v4hi)__m2);
bin-lwe.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
bin-lwe.c: /usr/lib/llvm-9/lib/clang/9.0.0/include/mmintrin.h:159:12: error: invalid conversion
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size
bin-lwe.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_packssdw((__v2si)__m1, (__v2si)__m2);
bin-lwe.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
bin-lwe.c: /usr/lib/llvm-9/lib/clang/9.0.0/include/mmintrin.h:189:12: error: invalid conversion
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size
bin-lwe.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_packuswb((__v4hi)__m1, (__v4hi)__m2);
bin-lwe.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
bin-lwe.c: /usr/lib/llvm-9/lib/clang/9.0.0/include/mmintrin.h:216:12: error: invalid conversion
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size
bin-lwe.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_punpckhbw((__v8qi)__m1, (__v8qi)__m2);
bin-lwe.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
bin-lwe.c: /usr/lib/llvm-9/lib/clang/9.0.0/include/mmintrin.h:239:12: error: invalid conversion
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size
bin-lwe.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_punpckhwd((__v4hi)__m1, (__v4hi)__m2);
bin-lwe.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
bin-lwe.c: /usr/lib/llvm-9/lib/clang/9.0.0/include/mmintrin.h:260:12: error: invalid conversion
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size
bin-lwe.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_punpckhdq((__v2si)__m1, (__v2si)__m2);
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bin-lwe.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
bin-lwe.c: /usr/lib/llvm-9/lib/clang/9.0.0/include/mmintrin.h:287:12: error: invalid conversion
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size
bin-lwe.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_punpcklbw((__v8qi)__m1, (__v8qi)__m2);
bin-lwe.c: ...
Implementation: crypto_kem/lac128/opt
Compiler: clang -mcpu=native -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv -Qunused-arguments -fPIC
-fPIE
bin-lwe.c: bin-lwe.c:98:10: warning: result of comparison of constant -1 with expression of type
'const char' is always false [-Wtautological-constant-out-of-range-compare]
bin-lwe.c: if(s[i]==-1)
bin-lwe.c: ~~~~^ ~~
bin-lwe.c: bin-lwe.c:160:10: warning: result of comparison of constant -1 with expression of type
'const char' is always false [-Wtautological-constant-out-of-range-compare]
bin-lwe.c: if(s[i]==-1)
bin-lwe.c: ~~~~^ ~~
bin-lwe.c: 2 warnings generated.
Implementation: crypto_kem/lac128/avx2
Compiler: gcc -march=native -mtune=native -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv -fPIC -fPIE
bin-lwe.c: bin-lwe.c:1:10: fatal error: immintrin.h: No such file or directory
bin-lwe.c: 1 | #include <immintrin.h>
bin-lwe.c: | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
bin-lwe.c: compilation terminated.
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The RQC implementation rqc128/opt had a compiler error that ends with compilation
terminated and is not included in the main analysis of this study. The compiler output is pasted
below.
Compiler output for rqc128/opt:
Implementation: crypto_kem/rqc128/opt
Compiler: clang -mcpu=native -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv -Qunused-arguments -fPIC
-fPIE
ffi_elt.c: In file included from ffi_elt.c:6:
ffi_elt.c: In file included from ./ffi.h:11:
ffi_elt.c: In file included from /usr/lib/llvm-7/lib/clang/7.0.1/include/x86intrin.h:29:
ffi_elt.c: In file included from /usr/lib/llvm-7/lib/clang/7.0.1/include/immintrin.h:28:
ffi_elt.c: /usr/lib/llvm-7/lib/clang/7.0.1/include/mmintrin.h:64:12: error: invalid conversion between
vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size
ffi_elt.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_vec_init_v2si(__i, 0);
ffi_elt.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ffi_elt.c: /usr/lib/llvm-7/lib/clang/7.0.1/include/mmintrin.h:143:12: error: invalid conversion
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size
ffi_elt.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_packsswb((__v4hi)__m1, (__v4hi)__m2);
ffi_elt.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ffi_elt.c: /usr/lib/llvm-7/lib/clang/7.0.1/include/mmintrin.h:173:12: error: invalid conversion
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size
ffi_elt.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_packssdw((__v2si)__m1, (__v2si)__m2);
ffi_elt.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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ffi_elt.c: /usr/lib/llvm-7/lib/clang/7.0.1/include/mmintrin.h:203:12: error: invalid conversion
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size
ffi_elt.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_packuswb((__v4hi)__m1, (__v4hi)__m2);
ffi_elt.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ffi_elt.c: /usr/lib/llvm-7/lib/clang/7.0.1/include/mmintrin.h:230:12: error: invalid conversion
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size
ffi_elt.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_punpckhbw((__v8qi)__m1, (__v8qi)__m2);
ffi_elt.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ffi_elt.c: /usr/lib/llvm-7/lib/clang/7.0.1/include/mmintrin.h:253:12: error: invalid conversion
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size
ffi_elt.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_punpckhwd((__v4hi)__m1, (__v4hi)__m2);
ffi_elt.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ffi_elt.c: /usr/lib/llvm-7/lib/clang/7.0.1/include/mmintrin.h:274:12: error: invalid conversion
between vector type '__m64' (vector of 1 'long long' value) and integer type 'int' of different size
ffi_elt.c: return (__m64)__builtin_ia32_punpckhdq((__v2si)__m1, (__v2si)__m2);
ffi_elt.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ffi_elt.c: ...
Implementation: crypto_kem/rqc128/opt
Compiler: gcc -march=native -mtune=native -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv -fPIC -fPIE
ffi_elt.c: In file included from ffi_elt.c:6:
ffi_elt.c: ffi.h:11:10: fatal error: x86intrin.h: No such file or directory
ffi_elt.c: #include <x86intrin.h>
ffi_elt.c: ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
ffi_elt.c: compilation terminated.
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Appendix B
The following tables include SUPERCOP output for crypto_kem that includes the time in
processor cycles, primitive, implementation of the algorithm, and compiler used for both the
Raspberry Pi 3B+ and the Raspberry Pi 4.
Table 13
aarch64, pi3bplusubuntuserver64, crypto_kem compiler output
Time

Relative Primitive
time

Implementation

Compiler

28681863

1.00

bike2l1nc

crypto_kem/bike2l
1nc/ref_ossl
(BIKE_v1.0_Additi
onal_11/18/2018)

gcc -march=native
-mtune=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008)

840038

1.00

mceliece348864 crypto_kem/mceli
f
ece348864f/vec

clang -mcpu=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-Qunused-arguments -fPIC
-fPIE (Clang 9.0.0
(tags/RELEASE 900/final))

399185

1.00

kyber512

crypto_kem/kyber
512/ref

clang -mcpu=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-Qunused-arguments -fPIC
-fPIE (Clang 9.0.0
(tags/RELEASE 900/final))

64181560

1.00

frodokem640

crypto_kem/frodok
em640/optimized

clang -mcpu=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-Qunused-arguments -fPIC
-fPIE (Clang 9.0.0
(tags/RELEASE 900/final))

6044516

1.00

hqc1281

crypto_kem/hqc12
81/opt

gcc -march=native
-mtune=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008)

1592907

1.00

ledakem13

crypto_kem/ledak
em13/portableopt

gcc -march=native
-mtune=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008)
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Table 13 continued
Time

Relative
time

Primitive

Implementation

Compiler

454115

1.00

newhope512cca

crypto_kem/new
hope512cca/ref

gcc -march=native
-mtune=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008)

536038

1.00

ntrukem443

crypto_kem/ntruk
em443/ref

gcc -march=native
-mtune=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008)

1569796

1.00

sntrup653

crypto_kem/sntru
p653/factored

gcc -march=native
-mtune=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008)

992215

1.00

ntskem1264

crypto_kem/ntsk
em1264/opt

gcc -march=native
-mtune=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008)

244617

1.00

r5nd0kem2iot

crypto_kem/r5nd
0kem2iot/opt

gcc -march=native
-mtune=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008)

312320

1.00

lightsaber

crypto_kem/light
saber/portable

clang -mcpu=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-Qunused-arguments -fPIC
-fPIE (Clang 9.0.0
(tags/RELEASE 900/final))

489846260 1.00

sikep503

crypto_kem/sike
p503/opt

clang -mcpu=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-Qunused-arguments -fPIC
-fPIE (Clang 9.0.0
(tags/RELEASE 900/final))

298911

threebears624r2
cpax

crypto_kem/three
bears624r2cpax/
opt

gcc -march=native
-mtune=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-fPIC -fPIE

1.00

53
Table 14
aarch64, pi4ubuntuserver64, crypto_kem compiler output
Time

Relative
time

Primitive

Implementation

Compiler

28323497

1.00

bike2l1nc

crypto_kem/bike2l1n
c/ref_ossl
(BIKE_v1.0_Addition
al_11/18/2018)

gcc -march=native
-mtune=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008)

836798

1.00

mceliece3488
64f

crypto_kem/mceliece
348864f/vec

clang -mcpu=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-Qunused-arguments -fPIC
-fPIE (Clang 9.0.0
(tags/RELEASE 900/final))

402344

1.00

kyber512

crypto_kem/kyber51
2/ref

clang -mcpu=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-Qunused-arguments -fPIC
-fPIE (Clang 9.0.0
(tags/RELEASE 900/final))

63898904

1.00

frodokem640

crypto_kem/frodoke
m640/optimized

clang -mcpu=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-Qunused-arguments -fPIC
-fPIE (Clang 9.0.0
(tags/RELEASE 900/final))

6043445

1.00

hqc1281

crypto_kem/hqc1281
/opt

gcc -march=native
-mtune=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008)

1582114

1.00

ledakem13

crypto_kem/ledakem
13/portableopt

gcc -march=native
-mtune=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008)

457541

1.00

newhope512c
ca

crypto_kem/newhop
e512cca/ref

gcc -march=native
-mtune=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008)
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Table 14 continued
Time

Relative Primitive
time

Implementation

Compiler

534005

1.00

ntrukem443

crypto_kem/ntruke
m443/ref

gcc -march=native
-mtune=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008)

1570757

1.00

sntrup653

crypto_kem/sntrup6
53/factored

gcc -march=native
-mtune=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008)

992119

1.00

ntskem1264

crypto_kem/ntskem
1264/opt

gcc -march=native
-mtune=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008)

245236

1.00

r5nd0kem2io
t

crypto_kem/r5nd0k
em2iot/opt

gcc -march=native
-mtune=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-fPIC -fPIE (9.2.1 20191008)

311889

1.00

lightsaber

crypto_kem/lightsa
ber/portable

clang -mcpu=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-Qunused-arguments -fPIC
-fPIE (Clang 9.0.0
(tags/RELEASE 900/final))

489766721

1.00

sikep503

crypto_kem/sikep5
03/opt

clang -mcpu=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-Qunused-arguments -fPIC
-fPIE (Clang 9.0.0
(tags/RELEASE 900/final))

298022

1.00

threebears62 crypto_kem/threebe gcc -march=native
4r2cpax
ars624r2cpax/opt
-mtune=native -O3
-fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-fPIC -fPIE
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Appendix C
The following tables include the SUPERCOP output for the amount of space in bytes for
a secret key, public key, ciphertext, and session key for Raspberry Pi 3B+ and Raspberry Pi 4.
aarch64, pi3bplusubuntuserver64, crypto_kem
Table 15
Secret key
bytes

system

16

r5nd0kem2iot

434

sikep503

540

ledakem13

701

ntrukem443

804

threebears624r2cpax

1518

sntrup653

1568

lightsaber

1632

kyber512

1888

newhope512cca

3165

hqc1281

4964

bike2l1nc

6452

mceliece348864f

9216

ntskem1264

19872

frodokem640
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Table 16
Public key
bytes

system

342

r5nd0kem2iot

378

sikep503

611

ntrukem443

672

lightsaber

800

kyber512

804

threebears624r2cpax

928

newhope512cca

994

sntrup653

1271

bike2l1nc

2080

ledakem13

3125

hqc1281

9616

frodokem640

261120

mceliece348864f

319488

ntskem1264
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Table 17
Ciphertext
bytes

system

128

mceliece348864f

128

ntskem1264

394

r5nd0kem2iot

402

sikep503

611

ntrukem443

736

kyber512

736

lightsaber

897

sntrup653

917

threebears624r2cpax

1040

ledakem13

1120

newhope512cca

1271

bike2l1nc

6234

hqc1281

9736

frodokem640
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Table 18
Session key
bytes

system

16

frodokem640

16

r5nd0kem2iot

16

sikep503

32

bike2l1nc

32

mceliece348864f

32

kyber512

32

ledakem13

32

newhope512cca

32

ntrukem443

32

sntrup653

32

ntskem1264

32

lightsaber

32

threebears624r2cpax

64

hqc1281
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aarch64, pi4ubuntuserver64, crypto_kem
Table 19
Secret key
bytes

system

16

r5nd0kem2iot

434

sikep503

540

ledakem13

701

ntrukem443

804

threebears624r2cpax

1518

sntrup653

1568

lightsaber

1632

kyber512

1888

newhope512cca

3165

hqc1281

4964

bike2l1nc

6452

mceliece348864f

9216

ntskem1264

19872

frodokem640
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Table 20
Public key
bytes

system

342

r5nd0kem2iot

378

sikep503

611

ntrukem443

672

lightsaber

800

kyber512

804

threebears624r2cpax

928

newhope512cca

994

sntrup653

1271

bike2l1nc

2080

ledakem13

3125

hqc1281

9616

frodokem640

261120

mceliece348864f

319488

ntskem1264
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Table 21
Ciphertext
bytes

system

128

mceliece348864f

128

ntskem1264

394

r5nd0kem2iot

402

sikep503

611

ntrukem443

736

kyber512

736

lightsaber

897

sntrup653

917

threebears624r2cpax

1040

ledakem13

1120

newhope512cca

1271

bike2l1nc

6234

hqc1281

9736

frodokem640
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Table 22
Session key
bytes

system

16

frodokem640

16

r5nd0kem2iot

16

sikep503

32

bike2l1nc

32

mceliece348864f

32

kyber512

32

ledakem13

32

newhope512cca

32

ntrukem443

32

sntrup653

32

ntskem1264

32

lightsaber

32

threebears624r2cpax

64

hqc1281
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Appendix D
The following tables include the SUPERCOP public-key cryptosystem output for the
secret key, public key, encrypting 0 bytes, encrypting 23 bytes, and encrypting many bytes for
Raspberry Pi 3B+ and Raspberry Pi 4.
aarch64, pi3bplusubuntuserver64, crypto_encrypt
Table 23
Secret Key
bytes

system

26

ledapkc10

493

r5nd1pke5d

607

ntruees401ep2

Table 24
Public Key
bytes

system

461

r5nd1pke5d

557

ntruees401ep2

4488

ledapkc10
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Table 25
Encrypting 0 bytes
bytes

system

552

ntruees401ep2

636

r5nd1pke5d

8976

ledapkc10

Table 26
Encrypting 23 bytes
bytes

system

529

ntruees401ep2

636

r5nd1pke5d

8953

ledapkc10

Table 27
Encrypting many bytes
bytes

system

544

ntruees401ep2

636

r5nd1pke5d

4521

ledapkc10
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aarch64, pi4ubuntuserver64, crypto_encrypt
Table 28
Secret Key
bytes

system

26

ledapkc10

493

r5nd1pke5d

607

ntruees401ep2

Table 29
Public Key
bytes

system

461

r5nd1pke5d

557

ntruees401ep2

4488

ledapkc10

Table 30
Encrypting 0 bytes
bytes

system

552

ntruees401ep2

636

r5nd1pke5d

8976

ledapkc10
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Table 31
Encrypting 23 bytes
bytes

system

529

ntruees401ep2

636

r5nd1pke5d

8953

ledapkc10

Table 32
Encrypting many bytes
bytes

system

544

ntruees401ep2

636

r5nd1pke5d

4521

ledapkc10

